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Racism in the Theory Canon:  
Hannah Arendt and ‘the one Great Crime in which America was Never Involved’ 
 
Patricia Owens* 
Sussex University 
 
Abstract. Hannah Arendt’s monumental study The Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951, 
is a founding text in postcolonial studies, locating the seeds of European fascism in the racism of 
imperial expansion. However, Arendt also harboured deep racial prejudices, especially when 
writing about people of African descent, which affected core themes in her political thought. The 
existing secondary literature has diagnosed but not adequately explained Arendt’s failures in this 
regard. This article shows that Arendt’s anti-black racism is rooted in her consistent refusal to 
analyse the colonial and imperial origins of racial conflict in the United States given the unique 
role of the American republic in her vision for a new post-totalitarian politics. In making this 
argument, the article also contributes to the vexed question of how international theorists should 
approach important ‘canonical’ thinkers whose writings have been exposed as racist, including 
methodological strategies for approaching such a body of work, and engages in a form of self-
critique for marginalising this problem in earlier writing on Arendt. 
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I should like to make it clear that as a Jew I take my sympathy for the cause of the Negroes as for 
all oppressed or under-privileged peoples for granted. 
 Hannah Arendt, ‘Reflections on Little Rock’, p.46 
 
One of the most significant political thinkers of the twentieth-century, and arguably the only 
woman admitted to the male-dominated ‘canon’ of political thought, Hannah Arendt is slowly but 
surely gaining a similar stature in the academic study of world politics.1  This entry into 
International Relations (IR) is belated to say the least. Franz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, and Jean-Paul 
                                                      
* For comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers as well as Helen M. Kinsella, 
Melanie Richter-Montpetit, Richard H. King, Kamran Matin, and Lara Coleman. Beate Jahn, Sam Knafo, Justin 
Rosenberg, Ben Selwyn, and Benno Teschke also gave helpful framing advice at the ‘Abstracts discussion group’ 
hosted by the Centre for Advanced International Theory, Sussex University. An earlier version was presented at the 
Millennium Conference, ‘Racialized Realities in World Politics’, at the LSE in October 2016. The discussant, Chris 
Brown, also gave helpful feedback. 
1 Anthony F. Lang, Jr. and John Williams (eds.) Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Reading across the Lines 
(London: Palgrave Press, 2005); Patricia Owens, Between War and Politics: International Relations and the thought of 
Hannah Arendt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Patrick Hayden, Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah 
Arendt and International Theory (London: Routledge, 2009); Owens, ‘Hannah Arendt’, in Jenny Edkins and Nick 
Vaughan-Williams (eds.) Critical Theorists and International Relations (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.31-41; 
Kimberley Hutchings, ‘A Conversation with Hannah Arendt (1906-1975)’ in Richard Ned Lebow, Peer Schouten, and 
Hidemi Suganami (eds.) The Return of the Theorists: Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations 
(London: Palgrave, 2016), pp.245-253 
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Sartre were not the only intellectuals to conceive European fascism as a kind of European 
imperialism turned inwards. In a work of breathtaking ambition, Arendt’s first major book, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, showed that the seeds of fascism were not German, but international. 
They were imperialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. She was the central theorist of the 
‘boomerang effect’, the unintended consequences of imperial blowback, decades before Michel 
Foucault.2 The scramble for Africa, she claimed, ‘became the most fertile soil for the flowering of 
what later was to become the Nazi elite. Here they had seen with their own eyes how peoples 
could be converted into races and how… one might put one’s own people into the position of the 
master race’.3 Origins not only became a founding text in postcolonial studies, leading some to 
claim that it anticipates Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth.4 It was among the first to engage in a 
sustained historical and global analysis of racist ideology. Arendt placed race thinking and racism 
at the core of the destruction of the European system of states. ‘Race thinking, rather than class-
thinking’, she insisted, ‘was the ever-present shadow accompanying the development of the 
comity of European nations, until it finally grew to be the powerful weapon for the destruction of 
those nations’.5 In arguing that European and eventually worldwide federation was the antidote to 
the ‘walking corpse’ of the sovereign state Arendt also became a leading inspiration for theories 
of post-national politics. Her critique of Zionism as a potential vehicle for Jewish fascism, her 
prescient claim that founding a Jewish state in Palestine would repeat the suffering of the Jews, 
made her one of the earliest and still most influential ‘post-Zionists’.6 
                                                      
2 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76 (New York: Picador, [1976] 
2003) 
3 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (new edition with added prefaces) (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, [1951] 1966), p.206. For an excellent account of the complicated mechanisms of the boomerang effect in 
Origins see Karuna Mantena, ‘Genealogies of Catastrophe: Arendt on the Logic and Legacy of Imperialism’ in Seyla 
Benhabib (ed.) Politics in Dark Times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
pp.83-112. For the best historical application of the idea see Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the 
Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005) 
4 Joan Cocks, Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National Question (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), p.47; Pascal Grosse, ‘From Colonialism to National Socialism to Postcolonialism: Hannah Arendt’s 
“Origins of Totalitarianism”’, Postcolonial Studies, Vol.9 (2006), pp.35-52 
5 Arendt, Origins, p.161  
6 Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings (edited by Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman) (New York: Schoken, 2007).  
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Hannah Arendt would thus seem to be a crucial, even irreplaceable, resource for 
analysing what she called ‘the nation-destroying and humanity-annihilating power of racism’ in 
world politics.7 In fact, the opposite may be true. Arendt harboured her own deep racial 
prejudices, especially when writing about Africans and people of African descent. This problem 
was not just a personal racial prejudice, for example as expressed in private correspondence while 
covering the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961, and was not limited to Africans. Surveying the 
courtroom in Israel, at the ‘top’, Arendt placed ‘the judges, the best of German Jewry. Below 
them, the prosecuting attorneys, Galicians, but still Europeans. Everything is organized by a 
police force that gives me the creeps, speaks only Hebrew, and looks Arabic... they would obey 
any order. And outside the doors’, Arendt saw an ‘oriental mob, as if one were in Istanbul or 
some other half-Asiatic country’.8 Racism was also not a minor issue in Arendt’s work, or 
something marginal to her substantive political theory. It affected core themes associated with 
what is most celebrated in her historical and theoretical work. The problem extends from her first 
book, in which she traded in horrific racial stereotypes about Africans, to her late public policy 
interventions, in which she disparaged African-Americans, all the way to her effort to theorise a 
new form of post-totalitarian politics, which relied on a distorted historical and political analysis 
of settler colonialism, slavery and racism in the United States.  
Existing analyses of Arendt’s racism fall into two broad camps. The first is highly critical, 
suggesting that these writings raise serious questions about the integrity of Arendt’s work as a 
whole.9 Another approach is more sympathetic and contextualist, imploring critics to keep 
                                                      
7 Arendt, Origins, p.162 
8 Arendt in Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Correspondence, 1926-1969 (edited by Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner) 
(trans. by Robert and Rita Kimber) (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), p.435  
9 See, for example, Shiraz Dossa, ‘Human Status and Politics: Hannah Arendt on the Holocaust’, Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, Vol.13, no.2 (1980), pp.309-323; Anne Norton, ‘Heart of Darkness: Africa and African Americans in 
the Writings of Hannah Arendt’ in Bonnie Honig (ed.) Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp.247-261; Robert Bernasconi, ‘The Double Face of the Political and the 
Social: Hannah Arendt and America’s Racial Division’, Research in Phenomenology, Vol.26 (1996), pp.3-24; Gail 
Presby, ‘Critique of Boers or Africans? Arendt’s Treatment of South Africa in The Origins of Totalitarianism’ in 
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (ed.) Postcolonial African Philosophy: a Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp.162-
180; Joy James, ‘All Power to the People! Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Communicative Power in a Racialized 
Democracy’ in Robert Bernasconi and Sybol Cook (ed.) Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy (Bloomington, 
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Arendt’s ‘larger aims… in view’.10 While some of Arendt’s toughest detractors misrepresent the 
nuance and context of some of her claims they are broadly right in diagnosing the scale of the 
problem for Arendt’s political thought. They should not be dismissed as presentist, self-righteous, 
or anachronistic, as if the problem can be reduced to Arendt not pursuing in her day the 
postcolonial agendas of our own.11 As Anne Norton has put it, Arendt’s writing on Africans and 
African-Americans ‘represent so dramatic a departure from the scholarly and civil character of 
her work as a whole that one might read them as an aberration... That course might do justice to 
Arendt as a private woman, but it would continue the unjust effects of her public writings’.12 Yet 
both Arendt’s defenders and critics have largely failed to adequately explain, as oppose to 
diagnose and critique, this departure in her work, that is, to offer more than psychological reasons 
for why she never made amends for some of the most troubling aspects of her writing on Africans 
and African-Americans, but consistently reproduced them.  
Consider, for example, why Arendt, the brilliant theorist of the boomerang effect, would 
insist that the United States had no history of imperialism relevant to race relations within the 
United States, that imperialism was the ‘one great crime in which America was never 
involved’?13 In the context of violent race struggles and the rise of Black Power, why would she 
dismiss African-American students’ calls for courses in African literature and Swahili and seek to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp.249-267; Robert H. King and Dan Stone (eds.) Hannah Arendt and the Uses of 
History: Imperialism, Nation, Race, and Genocide (New York: Berghan Books, 2007); Jimmy Casas Klausen, ‘Hannah 
Arendt’s Antiprimitivism’, Political Theory, Vol.38, no.3 (2010), pp.394-423; A. Dirk Moses, ‘Das römische Gespräch 
in a New Key: Hannah Arendt, Genocide, and the Defense of Republican Civilization’, The Journal of Modern History, 
Vol. 85, No. 4 (2013), pp.867-913; Kathryn T. Gines, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2014). For a rare critique of Arendt in IR see the brief discussion in Siba N’Zatioula 
Grovogui, ‘Deferring difference: a postcolonial critique of the “race problem” in moral thought’ in Sanjay Seth (ed.) 
Postcolonial Theory and International Relations: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2013), especially pp.14-
17 
10 Roy T. Tsao, ‘Arendt and the Modern State: Variations on Hegel in The Origins of Totalitarianism’, The Review of 
Politics, Vol.66, no.1 (2004), p.122. See, for example, Lisa Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage, 1996); Richard H. King, ‘Hannah Arendt: Race, History, and Humanism’ in Race, Culture and the 
Intellectuals, 1940-1970 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp.96-120; Owens, Between War 
and Politics; Richard H. King, ‘On Race and Culture: Hannah Arendt and Her Contemporaries’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed.) 
Politics in Dark Times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.113-134; 
pp.287-296; Dana Villa, ‘Arendt and totalitarianism: Contexts of interpretation’, European Journal of Political Theory, 
Vol.10, no.2 (2011), pp.287-296; Richard H. King, Arendt and America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015) 
11 Villa, ‘Arendt and totalitarianism’, p. 296 
12 Norton, ‘Heart of Darkness’, p.248 
13 Hannah Arendt, ‘Reflections on Little Rock’, Dissent, Vol.6, no.1 (1959), p.46 
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deny the political reality of the Third World? Why would she hold theorists and practitioners of 
anticolonial violence to higher justificatory standards than those European Jews resisting Hitler? 
These questions touch on some of Arendt’s most troubling interventions into the so-called ‘Negro 
question’.14 And yet, to date, commentators have largely ignored one of the most obvious 
explanations for these otherwise inexplicable claims: that in almost all of Arendt’s writings on 
race struggles in America she sought to delink them from their global, transnational context, and 
failed. In contrast, this article demonstrates that Arendt consistently refused to extend her 
powerful boomerang thesis to contemporary racial conflict in the United States. It argues that this 
refusal was rooted in the unique role of the American republic in her vision for a new post-
totalitarian politics, which necessitated excluding the United States from the kind of decentered, 
transnational analysis of racism found in Origins.15 Moreover, in her prominent role as a public 
intellectual Arendt sought to restrict the political and historical context of the ‘Negro question’ to 
the domestic politics of the United States out of fear of an open race war, as if to acknowledge its 
colonial and imperial origins would actually justify violence in America as a form of anti-colonial 
self-defence. In other words, the explanation for Arendt’s race problem is connected to the core 
subject matter of IR. 
In addition to showing the importance of an international frame for reading Arendt, the 
article also addresses some of the methodological issues at stake in decolonising the theory canon 
for a non-racist IR. Arendt is only one of many possible case studies of racism in twentieth-
century political theory, but her thought is potentially one of the most immediately obvious to 
address. Max Weber quit the pan-German League for not being racist enough.16 Martin Heidegger 
and Carl Schmitt are well known for their fascism. Emmanuel Levinas was unable to recognise 
                                                      
14 Gines, Hannah Arendt and the Negro Question 
15 This is not a totally dissimilar logic to Robbie Shilliam’s account of why Marx adopted a false unilinear theory of 
history; it was the basis on which he could theorise a socialist revolution in his ‘backward’ homeland of Germany. See 
Robbie Shilliam, ‘Marx’s Path to Capital: the International Dimension of an Intellectual Journey’, History of Political 
Thought, Vol.27, no.2 (2006), pp.349-375. I am grateful to Kamran Matin for suggesting this parallel. 
16 Andrew Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, The German Empire, and the Globalization of the 
New South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p.102 
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‘the face’ of Palestinians, that is, to see the ethical demands they placed upon him as a Zionist; 
they remained a ‘faceless horde’.17 Unlike Weber and many of her contemporaries, Hannah 
Arendt was not consciously committed to white superiority, which makes her all the more 
interesting in a contemporary age of ‘neo-racism’.18 Moreover, the substantive questions that she 
addressed in her political thought, from student demands for university reform to the prospects 
for the American Republic, have enormous contemporary relevance, including efforts to 
decolonise syllabi in IR and responses to the election of Trump. Arendt is a highly original and 
powerful thinker. Indeed, a vital intellectual resource for contemporary post-Zionism is also at 
stake in our evaluation of Arendt. Writing for the Jerusalem Post, Seth J. Frantzman has recently 
seized on Arendt’s racism problem to discredit the entirety of her work, suggesting she was a 
‘white supremacist’ little better than the Nazis who arrested, interred and almost killed her in the 
1930s.19 Though easy to dismiss as politically motivated, such attacks are not without political 
consequence. Arendt’s Jewish Writings remain prescient in the struggle against anti-Arab racism 
in Israel and elsewhere. As Moshe Zimmerman has put it, ‘Arendt’s writings about Zionism 
provide so-called post-Zionists with good arguments, or at least with a wonderful alibi’.20  
There is now an excellent and growing body of work on racism in world politics, 
including in leading textbooks.21 This article contributes to this literature by showing how, why 
and with what effect Hannah Arendt denied the settler colonial and imperial origins of race 
                                                      
17 Judith Butler, ‘Unable to Kill: Levinas contra Levinas’ in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp.54-68 
18 Étienne Balibar, ‘Is There a “Neo-Racism”?’ in Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.) Race, Nation, 
Class: Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso, 1991), pp.17-28 
19 Seth J. Frantzman, ‘Hannah Arendt, white supremacist’, The Jerusalem Post, May 6, 2016. Available at 
<http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Hannah-Arendt-white-supremacist-456007> (accessed September 29, 2016) 
20 Moshe Zimmerman, ‘Hannah Arendt, the Early “Post-Zionist”’ in Steven Aschheim (ed.) Hannah Arendt in 
Jerusalem (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), p.181. Also see Jacqueline Rose, The Question of Zion 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). This is despite the fact that Arendt was an early supporter of Zionism on 
the troubling grounds that the Jews had better cultivated the land. See Shmuel Lederman, ‘Making the Desert Bloom: 
Hannah Arendt and Zionist Discourse’, The European Legacy, Vol.21, no.4 (2016), pp.393-407 and Moses, ‘Das 
römische Gespräch’, pp.894-899 
21 Alex Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam (eds.) Confronting the Global Colour Line: Race and Racism in 
International Relations (London: Routledge, 2014); Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The 
Birth of American International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); Robbie Shilliam, ‘Race in 
World Politics’ in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds.) The Globalization of World Politics: an 
Introduction to International Relations (seventh edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp.285-300 
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relations in the United States. It proceeds in two parts. The first examines Arendt’s original 
boomerang thesis, key parts of which adopted, reproduced and even empathised with a number of 
the racial stereotypes found among European imperialists. Little in Arendt’s work is more 
disturbing, or, as Kateb has written, ‘Nowhere does she take more chances - is at greater risk - 
than in her discussion of antiblack racism in Africa’.22 We see this in the manner of her 
distinctions between race thinking and racism and settler colonialism and the ‘new imperialism’ 
of late nineteenth-century as well as her contrast between cultured and natural peoples. Some of 
the racist and ethnocentric tropes of Origins, in which she denigrated Africans, find their way into 
her later political theory and public policy interventions, which are analysed in the second part of 
the essay. This section situates Arendt’s ‘American’ writings on race within the global struggles 
that was so central to her own thinking on these questions, but that have been largely ignored in 
the secondary literature. What happens when our reading of Arendt’s racism is placed within this 
frame? We find Arendt - unsuccessfully - placing a protective cordon around the American 
republic. The historical reality underpinning Arendt’s boomerang thesis was, in the end, 
debilitating to her own claims about the possibilities of political freedom and republican 
government in the United States. The conclusion considers how to approach important ‘canonical’ 
political thinkers whose writings have been exposed as racist, including methodological strategies 
for approaching such a body of work, and engages in a form of self-critique for marginalising this 
problem in earlier writing on Arendt.  
 
I. ‘Some Specimen of an Animal Species’ 
 
Hannah Arendt grounded her history of totalitarianism in racial imperialism, securing her 
formative role in postcolonial scholarship. ‘Lying right under anybody’s nose’, in the European 
empires, ‘were many of the elements which gathered together could create a totalitarian 
                                                      
22 George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil (Totowa, NY: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), p.61 
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government on the basis of racism’.23 Yet more significant for us is Arendt’s insistence on 
totalitarianism’s unprecedented character, that there was something discontinuous between 
imperialism and Nazism. Her analysis of the horrible originality of totalitarianism marks her 
distance from postcolonial scholars who vehemently reject - as racist - the notion that Nazi crimes 
were different. As W.E.B. DuBois famously wrote, ‘there was no Nazi atrocity - concentration 
camps, wholesale maiming and murder, defilement of women or ghastly blasphemy of childhood 
- which the Christian civilization of Europe had not long been practicing against colored folk in 
all parts of the world in the name of and for the defense of a Superior Race born to rule the 
world’. 24  Yet, for Arendt, there was a chasm between the concentration camps used for 
population control in imperial wars, in which many tens of thousands of civilians died, and the 
Nazi gas chambers, the central institution of totalitarianism. It was not a question of numbers, or 
even their European victims, but the anti-utilitarian character of the extermination camps 
fundamentally set them apart. Unlike all previous forms of domination, including chattel slavery, 
‘the gas chambers did not benefit anybody’.25 Totalitarianism was a rupture in human history.  
Whether or not one agrees with DuBois, it is certain that Arendt’s response to 
totalitarianism led her to produce one of the most original and significant bodies of twentieth-
century political thought. Unfortunately, the particular way she sought to establish 
totalitarianism’s novelty relied on a series of evocative but deeply problematic historical 
distinctions. The most important for our purpose is that between race thinking and racism and 
settler colonialism and the ‘new imperialism’ of the late-nineteenth-century.26 For Arendt, the 
formal governments of settler colonialism and traditional empire had no counterpart in the age of 
the ‘new imperialism’. There was a shift from limited and predictable goals to the limitless 
                                                      
23 Arendt, Origins, p.221, 185 
24 W. E. Burghardt DuBois, The World and Africa: an Inquiry into the part which Africa has played in world history 
(Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, [1946] 2015), p.23.  
25 Hannah Arendt, ‘Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps [1950]’ in Essays in 
Understanding (edited by Jerome Kohn) (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1994), p.236 
26 Arendt also distinguished between ordinary Jew-hatred and the ideology of anti-Semitism. See Arendt, Origins, 
chapter one.  
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pursuit of power. Similarly, Arendt argued that the ‘race thinking’ of the eighteenth-century used 
to justify civilisational hierarchies and discrimination was different from the more virulent 
ideology of racism, which she again claimed was a product of the nineteenth-century. Race 
thinking had permitted some form of co-existence between groups. Indeed, Arendt argued that 
earlier colonial settlers were never ‘seriously concerned with discrimination against other peoples 
as lower races’. 27  In contrast, racism was an explicit ideological system to justify the 
radicalisation of imperial expansion. Racial hierarchy became the ‘new key to history’, a 
universal law to validate equally novel forms of global domination.28 Just as Arendt insisted that 
anti-Semitism was not the modern manifestation of some timeless hatred of the Jews, she claimed 
that there was no ‘immanent logic’ to racism; ‘even slavery’, she insisted, ‘though actually 
established on a strict racial basis, did not make the slave-holding peoples race-conscious before 
the nineteenth-century’. 29  Anti-Semitism, racism, and the new imperialism were historical 
phenomenon that crystalised to become the unprecedented phenomenon of twentieth-century 
totalitarianism.  
If, as Arendt claimed, totalitarianism was a fundamental break, then conventional 
historical narrative based on the causal sequence of long-term developmental processes was 
inadequate. Arendt was especially scathing of all forms of process-thinking and developmental 
histories, taking Hegel’s Philosophy of History as exemplary.30 There is some irony then for 
while Arendt rejected developmental philosophies of history she was unable to move beyond 
Hegel’s associated hierarchy of civilisations. Specifically, she adopted the distinction, also 
prevalent in German anthropology, between Kulturvölker and Naturvölker, cultured and natural 
peoples, those with history and those without. 31 In doing so, Arendt perpetuated some of the 
                                                      
27 Arendt, Origins, p.182 
28 Arendt, Origins, p.170 
29 Arendt, Origins, p.177 
30 On Arendt’s approach to history, its international origins and potential relevance to international thought, see Owens, 
‘The International Origins of Hannah Arendt’s Historical Method’, Political Power and Social Theory, forthcoming, 
2017 
31 King, ‘Hannah Arendt’, pp.116-117; Presby, ‘Critique of Boers or Africans?’ p.175 
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worst Eurocentric and racist assumptions of the philosophical tradition she sought to overturn. As 
Klausen has brilliantly shown, Arendt’s antiprimitivism ‘converges with and disjoins from racial 
discourses’.32 This problem extends from her analysis of imperialism and the deprivation of 
statelessness through to her celebrated political theory. Arendt’s brilliant and prescient claim 
about the deprivations of statelessness and the significance of a public political world depended 
on ‘a narrowly ethnocentric premise’ about what counts as a fully human status.33 In effect, as 
argued later, Arendt would need to actively deny the continuing relevance of her boomerang 
thesis to sustain some of the core features of her vision for a new post-totalitarian politics. 
Consider chapter seven of Imperialism, ‘Race and Bureaucracy’, which contains the 
section, ‘The Phantom World of the Dark Continent’.34 Arendt’s purpose here is to understand the 
mindset of those who massacre entire populations without believing they had done anything 
wrong. The conscious aims of the Nazis most direct European forerunners, the Pan-German and 
Pan-Slav movements, were first laid bare in Africa. They ‘can be watched like a laboratory test in 
the Boers’ early and sad attempt’ to transform a ‘people into a horde’.35 These Dutch settlers 
thought they were a chosen people. To Arendt, they were ‘the only European group that ever, 
though in complete isolation, had to live in a world of black savages’.36 Their racism, Arendt 
claimed, was ‘the emergency explanation of human beings whom no European or civilized man 
could understand and whose humanity so frightened and humiliated the immigrants that they no 
longer cared to belong to the same human species’. 37  In a kind of nineteenth-century 
environmental and demographic determinism, Arendt depicted the Boers - and her own - sense of 
the ‘overwhelming monstrosity of Africa’, the ‘merciless sun’ and ‘entirely hostile nature’, the 
‘great horror’ of a place ‘populated and overpopulated by savages’ as ‘incomprehensible as the 
                                                      
32 Klausen, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Antiprimitivism’, p.395 
33 Dossa, ‘Human Status’, p.320.  
34Arendt, Origins, pp.186-197  
35 Arendt, Origins, p.196  
36 Arendt, Origins, p.191 
37 Arendt, Origins, p.124 
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inmates of a madhouse’.38 All this gave ‘Boer racism, unlike the other brands, a touch of 
authenticity’.39 Arendt quotes extensively from Joseph Conrad’s 1899 novella Heart of Darkness 
to substantiate her claims about what happened to European identity in the encounter with the 
extreme other. Fear and repugnance, when refracted through new ideologies of race, almost 
inevitably led them to ‘Exterminate the brutes!’40 Arendt was seeking to show the effects of the 
Boers inability to accord equal worth to those they viewed as ‘alien’. Foreshadowing what would 
become of European Jews such a figure ‘is a frightening symbol of the fact of difference as 
such… and indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, 
therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy’.41  
Hannah Arendt was not seeking to justify extermination or massacres, but in her effort to 
‘understand the experiential basis’ of the Boers’ moral failings she came too close to 
apologetics.42 Specifically, she suggested that Boer racism was different, even justifiable, because 
of the character of the peoples it was directed against. ‘African savages… had frightened 
Europeans out of their wits’.43 Like Hegel and Marx, it was self-evident to Arendt that ‘tribal’ 
Africans were more primitive than Europeans; ‘as far as we know, [they] had never found by 
themselves any adequate expression of human reason or human passion in either cultural deeds or 
popular customs, and which had developed human institutions only to a very low level’.44 Aware 
of the obvious implications, Arendt distanced the issue from ‘race’ to implicate the capacity to 
rise above ‘nature’. ‘What made them different from other human beings’, she wrote, ‘was not at 
all the color of their skin but… that they treated nature like their undisputed master, that they had 
not created a human world, a human reality’.45 Arendt’s principle agenda was not to denigrate 
‘tribal’ Africans as such, but to show that because they ‘were, as it were, “natural” human beings 
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who lacked the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, …when European 
men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder’.46 Arendt 
was trying to suggest that any mutual recognition of rights depends on human artifice; that there 
was no such thing as ‘natural’ rights. But she could only do so on a racist premise. We know 
Arendt shared the Boers view that there was a ‘touch of inhumanity among human beings who 
apparently were as much a part of nature as wild animals’ since it accords with what we know is 
her own well developed view of what it is to be fully human.47  
One of the most fundamental of Hannah Arendt’s ideas, underlying almost all her 
contributions to political theory, is the distinction between nature and culture, between what is 
given and what is fabricated by humans through work. Her philosophical anthropology, most 
fully explicated in The Human Condition, was based on the premise that all humans have 
particular capacities to engage in labour, work, and political action.48 But only under certain 
conditions are humans able to move beyond laboring to fully realise each of these capacities. 
Hence some people are more or less ‘cultured’, more or less free, and thus more or less fully 
human. It was Arendt’s personal experience of and writing on statelessness that led her to claim 
that political freedom was wholly dependent on the ability to forge a public realm grounded on 
the appropriate distinction between nature and political artifice, between human life and the 
political world; the ‘abstract nakedness of being nothing but human’ was politically irrelevant, 
even dangerous. Similarly, when racism triumphed, she claimed, all ‘deeds are… explained as 
“necessary” consequences of some “Negro” qualities; he has become some specimen of an 
animal species, called man’.49 There was no in-born human dignity to protect this ‘animal species’ 
separate from the concrete laws and institutions that upheld political rights. Human status was a 
function of politics. The problem is that Arendt made this argument through maligning cultures 
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and peoples that she deemed unworldly and thus primitive. Her denigration of ‘tribal Africans’ 
did not occur through a crude evolutionism. All humans had particular capacities to engage in 
labour, work, and political action. But, for Arendt, the Boers degraded themselves by failing to 
properly cultivate a fully human world. They regressed from their full humanity. The implication 
is that ‘natives’, in not fully realising their capacity to create an enduring world, were never fully 
human.50  
In indicting the Boers Arendt dehumanised Africans for she claimed that the Boers, but 
not Africans, should have known better. Thus we find Arendt’s most scathing condemnation of 
the Boers is for being ‘lazy and unproductive’, for degrading themselves by falling to the level of 
Africans, living off their slaves as Africans had lived off nature. In her words, 
They treated the natives as raw material and lived on them as one might live on the fruits 
of wild trees… to vegetate on essentially the same level as the black tribes had vegetated 
for thousands of years… When the Boers, in their fright and misery, decided to use these 
savages as though they were just another form of animal life, they embarked upon a 
process which could only end with their own degradation into a white race living beside 
and together with black races from whom in the end they would differ only in the color of 
their skin.51  
The Boers had betrayed the putatively human need, exemplified by cultured Europeans, to 
transform nature into culture, the earth into a world, and were thus ‘the first European group to 
become completely alienated from the pride which Western man felt in living in a world created 
and fabricated by himself’.52 Arendt did not consider the possibility that those Africans of whom 
she wrote, but about which she knew almost nothing, possessed their own form of political 
activity and world making that was not ‘a world of folly’, that they did not live ‘on an unprepared 
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and unchanged nature’53 or ‘without the future of a purpose and the past of an accomplishment’.54 
She was not interested in whether indigenous African peoples engaged in their own world making, 
practicing forms of art, craft, and political co-existence ‘prior to their reduction to mere labor by a 
system of exploitation’.55 
Some scholars have defended Arendt by insisting that she was conveying the Boers’ view 
of Africans, not her own. It is therefore beside the point that ‘Arendt gave voice to the Boer’, but 
‘left the African silent’.56 This is not entirely persuasive, ‘the moral, as well as the political, 
significance’ of Arendt’s broader agenda notwithstanding.57 She was obviously doing more than 
describing the Boers view of Africa and the ‘native life’ of Africans.58 She rationalised and even 
sympathised with racist tropes. Consider her comment on the ‘boomerang effect’ on Chinese and 
Indian laborers imported to southern Africa; ‘for the first time, people were treated in almost the 
same way as those African savages... The difference was only that there could be no excuse and 
no humanly comprehensible reason for treating Indians and Chinese as though they were not 
human beings. In a certain sense it is only here that the real crime began, because here everyone 
ought to have known what they were doing’.59 The issue is not whose voice is privileged - the 
Boers or the Africans - but what Arendt revealed of herself when representing both. Arendt 
clearly moved from including the Boers ‘within the grasp of the empathetic imagination’60 to 
sharing some of their views and adding insults of her own. The Heart of Darkness, Arendt’s 
primary source in ‘The Phantom World of the Dark Continent’, is obviously deeply racist. Yet, as 
Moruzzi writes, in Origins too, ‘black bodies are constructed in the narrative as so unnervingly 
other and abject that an encounter with them, at the margins of empire, can draw white/Western 
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civilization right over the edge and into the dark abyss’.61  
If the effect of Arendt’s writings on Africans were restricted to a few passages in Origins, 
written in the 1940s, then they might be cordoned off and explained by their context. As Richard 
H. King writes, Arendt ‘may have transferred her anger, shame, and contempt for what happened 
to the Jews to contempt for what happened to the Africans’.62 But long after Arendt became a 
citizen of the United States in 1951 she persisted in misrepresenting African history and people of 
African descent. There is an additional, though largely neglected source of Hannah Arendt’s 
failure in this regard. The highly distinctive place of the United States in her project for a new 
post-totalitarian politics necessitated excluding her new home from the transnational relations, 
both colonial and imperial, that she had so effectively analysed in her first book. This was the 
only basis on which Arendt could plausibly make her claims about the reality of public political 
freedom in the American republic, that the American Revolution had ‘endowed the affairs of men 
with some measure of dignity and greatness’.63 Benjamin R. Barber has noted that Arendt 
‘seemed to forgive nothing associated with Europe’s recent past while exonerating America of 
just about everything others might regard as dark in its history’. But this is not only the 
‘intellectual schizophrenia typical of reflective refugees’. 64  Arendt’s deeply problematic 
comments about African-Americans often appear alongside equally dubious attempts to sever the 
historical and political link between racism in America and the forms of imperial racism analysed 
in Origins. This move, part gift to her adopted homeland, meant that she was unable to extend her 
unmatched analysis of the right-less condition of the stateless to those African-Americans who 
were effectively stateless within the United States. 
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II. The Missing Boomerang: ‘the one great crime in which America was never involved’ 
 
For many of Arendt’s critics the clearest evidence of a Eurocentric double standard in her writing 
is found in the eloquent praise she offered in the 1940s for Jewish uprisings against the Nazis as 
well as her support for the creation of a Jewish army as an act of Jewish political founding, which 
she did not equate with Zionism.65 In 1968, in contrast, Arendt claimed that ‘Negro violence’ in 
America is only ‘political to the small extent that it is hoped to dramatize justified grievances, to 
serve as an unhappy substitute for organized power’.66 Serequeberhan has thus claimed that ‘what 
she recognises in the European she fails to see in the non-European’.67 Katherine Gines goes 
further, suggesting that Arendt condemned anticolonial violence.68 Such claims are based on 
Arendt’s lengthy critique of the justification for violence in the writings of Franz Fanon and Jean-
Paul Sartre. In her 1970 essay, ‘On Violence’, Arendt objected to the claim that anticolonial 
violence might contribute to a new more humanistic order of global freedom led by the Third 
World, of the formerly oppressed ‘starting a new history of Man’.69 She criticised Fanon’s claim 
that such violence could be an expression of life and creativity, a ‘creative madness’.70 But there 
is no principled opposition to anticolonial violence in this essay, or anywhere else in Arendt’s 
work. Violence to force the end of imperial rule could be justified, but only on instrumental 
grounds, as a means to an end, while always recognising that the most likely outcome was more 
violence. Arendt certainly mischaracterised Fanon and Sartre in ‘On Violence’.71 But whatever 
one makes of Arendt’s distorted reading of these thinkers she is clearly not condemning 
anticolonial violence as such, but the form of its justification within a particular tradition of 
                                                      
65 Arendt, ‘For the Honor and Glory of the Jewish People’, Jewish Writings, pp.199-201  
66 Arendt, ‘Is America By Nature A Violent Society?’ New York Times Magazine, 28 April 1968, p.24 
67 Tsenay Serequeberhan, The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy: Horizon and Discourse (London: Routledge, 1994), 
p.77 
68 Gines, Hannah Arendt, p.93 
69 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p.315 
70 Fanon, Wretched, p.95; Gines, Hannah Arendt, pp.99-100 
71 Arendt offered a highly selective and simplistic reading of Sartre that amounts to ‘willful distortion... She selected 
bits and pieces from Reason and Violence that fit her critique, but she is not fair or true to the analysis presented’ in that 
or other works. Gines, Hannah Arendt, p.107. 
 17 
thought.72 On this issue at least, we should not assimilate Arendt’s critique of Fanon to what is 
most troubling in The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
The more revealing problem in ‘On Violence’ is Arendt’s dismissal of the Third World as 
the political organisation of newly decolonised states and as an object of transnational solidarity 
among students in the West. ‘To think…’ she wrote, ‘that there is such a thing as a “Unity of the 
Third World”, to which one could address the new slogan in the era of decolonization “Natives of 
all underdeveloped countries unite!” (Sartre) is to repeat Marx’s worst illusions on a greatly 
enlarged scale and with considerably less justification. The Third World is not a reality but an 
ideology’.73 Later pressed in an interview to justify this statement Arendt made no differentiation 
between Sartre’s riff on Marx and world historical reality, what her interviewer referred to as 
‘simply the existence of the third world, the reality of the third world… Possibly there’s a 
misunderstanding here’.74 ‘Not a bit of it’, Arendt replied.75 Instead, she restated her assertion that 
the Third World was ‘an illusion. Africa, Asia, South America - those are realities… Try telling a 
Chinese sometime that he belongs to exactly the same world as an African Bantu tribesman and, 
believe me, you’ll get the surprise of your life’.76 Giving agency only to Europeans, Arendt 
suggested that the Third World concept originated in the imperialist ‘distinction between colonial 
countries and colonizing powers. For the imperialists, Egypt was, naturally, like India: they both 
fell under the heading of “subject races”. This imperialist leveling out of all differences is copied 
by the New Left, only with the labels reversed’.77  
One of Arendt’s central ideas, developed in The Human Condition, was that universal 
experience is not a substitute for particularity and plurality. As argued elsewhere, Arendt was 
committed to political plurality not simply as a characteristic of individuals but as an essential 
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intrinsically valuable result of distinct territorial entities.78 Yet in the context in which she was 
making her statements about the Third World Arendt was unable to fathom how a leveling out of 
some differences among states could draw attention to a common condition of global hierarchy 
and subordination.79 In the context of the global Cold War many Chinese leaders did, indeed, 
seek alliances with African anti-apartheid and liberation movements. In fact, in the early 1970s, 
Mao introduced his ‘three worlds theory’ of international politics, situating China within the 
‘Third World’.80 Mao’s vision was certainly ‘ideological’. But regional differences and histories 
notwithstanding, ordinary Chinese and African people were participants in the ‘same world’ of 
superpower hostility and neocolonial struggle. The Third World Project began as early as 1928 
when anticolonial leaders met in Brussels to form the League Against Imperialism and was 
revived in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 against violent and non-violent subversion.81 Arendt 
erased the multi-national history of the Third World by reducing it to a kind of African interest 
group, as if the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 never existed. ‘The only ones who 
have an obvious political interest in saying that there is a third world’, she claimed, ‘are, of course, 
those who stand on the lowest step - that is, the Negros in Africa. In their case it’s easy to 
understand; all the rest is empty talk’.82  
Arendt offered no contemporary evidence for her dismissal of the Third World because 
her main interest was not postcolonial leaders attempting to transform the global political and 
economic architecture. Her real target was the ‘empty talk’ of Western intellectuals and students 
who evoked the Third World cause, claimed solidarity with it, and thereby, in Arendt’s view, 
justified violence inside the United States. Her tone is mocking and racially charged. Student 
interest in Mao, Castro, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh were like ‘pseudo-religious incantations 
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for saviors from another world; they would also call for Tito if only Yugoslavia were farther 
away and less approachable’.83 Things become more sinister when she turns to the movement for 
Black Power; ‘its ideological commitment to the nonexistent “Unity of the Third World” is not 
sheer romantic nonsense. They have an obvious interest in a black-white dichotomy; this too is of 
course mere escapism - an escape into a dream world in which Negros would constitute an 
overwhelming majority of the world’s population’.84 Rather than seek to understand why anti-
racist activists might situate themselves within wider anticolonial and -neocolonial struggles, that 
is, in the context of global white supremacy, Arendt reduced black solidarity to a crass 
demographic calculation.85 She presented black students as more violent than whites, with the 
backing of the wider ‘black community’. ‘Serious violence’, she claimed, ‘entered the scene only 
with the appearance of the Black Power movement on American campuses. Negro students, the 
majority of them admitted without academic qualification, regarded and organized themselves as 
an interest group, the representatives of the black community’.86 These black students then made 
‘nonsensical and obviously damaging demands’ such as instruction in the ‘nonexistent subjects’ 
of African literature, ‘soul courses’, and Swahili, ‘a nineteenth-century kind of no-language’.87 
The ‘white rebels’, in contrast, put forth ‘disinterested and usually highly moral claims’, such as 
support for ‘nonviolent “participatory democracy”’.88  
How and why is Hannah Arendt in the position of denying the reality of the Third World, 
of dismissing black student demands, and claiming that Swahili is a ‘no-language’? What is at 
stake, for Arendt, in claiming that African literature is a ‘non-existent subject’? My argument is 
that ‘On Violence’ should be read, in part, as Arendt’s futile effort to deny that her own 
boomerang thesis applied in the New World to maintain an idealised version of the American 
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republic, a form of American exceptionalism. At stake in Arendt’s attack on Fanon and Sartre, 
Black Power, African literature, and black students is more than a defense of a particular theory 
of violence and Eurocentric curriculum. Arendt believed that there was inevitability to the 
violence of interracial struggle. Echoing her account of the Boers massacres of tribal Africans, 
she wrote, ‘Racism, white or black, is fraught with violence by definition because it objects to 
natural organic facts - a white or black skin - which no persuasion or power could change; all one 
can do, when the chips are down, is to exterminate their bearers… Violence in interracial struggle 
is always murderous, but it is not “irrational”; it is the logical and rational consequence of 
racism’.89 Arendt is surely right that racism is inevitably violent. It is violence. But she refused to 
place African-American struggles in a colonial frame, and thus had to somehow radically 
dissociate black struggles in the United States from their violent origins and the political 
implications of these origins. Hence, pace Arendt’s critics, she engaged in this denial precisely 
because there is a justification for anticolonial violence. Arendt’s difficulty is what this might 
mean for the United States. Arendt’s problem becomes clearer when ‘On Violence’ is read 
alongside her earlier essay ‘Reflections on Little Rock’, written in 1957, published in 1959, and 
second only to Eichmann in Jerusalem in the scandal caused.90  
The immediate context of this essay was the front-page image of a black girl, Elizabeth 
Eckford, attempting to enter the newly desegregated Little Rock Central High School, flanked by 
armed National Guards escorting her through the baying white mob of protesters. ‘What would I 
do if I were a Negro mother?’ Arendt asked. She responded that ‘under no circumstances would I 
expose my child to conditions which made it appear as though it wanted to push its way into a 
group where it was not wanted’.91 African-American parents failed to protect the dignity of their 
children by sending them into a hostile environment for the sake of bettering their social 
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condition. Civil rights leaders should turn their attention to anti-miscegenation laws where the 
more fundamental right to marry was at stake. Education was a private right of parents; even 
racists had the right to educate their children as they wished. Drawing on Jewish experience in 
Europe rather than the history of American racism, Arendt inevitably failed to translate the 
essentially historical and power-laced distinctions between social, political, public and private 
into normative categories applied to public education. In the voluminous critiques of Arendt’s 
essay it is not often noted that ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ began with some reflections on 
international affairs.  
Arendt opened her essay by lamenting how ‘unfortunate’ and ‘unjust’ it is that ‘the events 
at Little Rock’ have damaged the United States in the court of world opinion and ‘become a 
major stumbling block to American foreign policy’.92 The root of the injustice was that ‘the 
country’s attitude to its Negro population is rooted in American tradition and nothing else… The 
fact that this [color] question has also become a major issue in world affairs is sheer coincidence 
as far as American history and politics are concerned; for the color problem in world politics 
grew out of the colonialism and imperialism of European nations - that is, the one great crime in 
which America was never involved’.93 Yet from the arrival of the first Europeans, and the 
expansion of the continental empire and overseas annexations, the United States was a 
fundamentally colonial and imperial republic, both of which were grounded in racism.94 Even her 
more sympathetic readers have criticised Arendt’s ‘historically inaccurate’ and ‘untenable 
generalizations’ in ‘Reflections on Little Rock’,95 placing them in the usual context of her 
overriding experience of how anti-Semitism worked in Europe and her failure to see black-white 
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relations in the United States as any different from other race relations. Arendt was also 
‘protective of her new country and homeland’, Benhabib writes, ‘although never becoming an 
apologist for it’. 96  But Arendt would never need to apologise for something - American 
imperialism - that she denied had ever happened. We need more than Jewish context to account 
for Arendt’s refusal to reckon with the United States colonial and imperial past - and present - 
and insistence that the ‘color question… is soluble only within the political and historical 
framework of the Republic’.97  
Why would Arendt begin her essay on school desegregation by denying a link between 
the ‘color problem’ in the United States and racial conflicts in the rest of the world, so flagrantly 
misrepresenting US imperialism, literally denying its existence? It is difficult to understand 
Arendt’s agenda except as an effort to quarantine the American republic from the transnational 
aspect of what W. E. B. DuBois famously called the ‘color-line, - the relation of the darker to the 
lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea’.98 As the political 
activist Stokely Carmichael put it in a 1967 address to the Organization of Latin American 
Solidarity,  
The struggle we are engaged in is international… This is even more apparent when we 
look at ourselves not as African-Americans of the United States, but as African-
Americans of the Americas… Our people are a colony within the United States; you are 
colonies outside the United States. It is more than a figure of speech to say that the black 
communities in America are the victims of white imperialism and colonial exploitation.99  
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Arendt never mentioned Stokely Carmichael by name, but ‘On Violence’ is her effort to withhold 
the political grounds for African-American solidarity with the justifiably violent struggles for the 
dignity and freedom of non-white peoples around the world. Hence, it is not quite right, as Joy 
James has written, that ‘Arendt ignored the promise and pitfalls of radical antiracist organizations 
such as the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, the Young Lords, the Brown Berets, 
and the Independentistas’.100 Arendt’s dismissal of black students and praise for whites was not 
because she was a leading proponent of non-violent civil disobedience, as if African-Americans 
were not pioneers of such activity. Rather she was deeply troubled by a notion of a continuum 
between colonial violence abroad and colonial violence ‘at home’, when this ‘home’ was her own 
and so much of her post-totalitarian political theory was invested in its civic republican form of 
government.101  
Arendt’s denial of American imperialism and disavowal of the Third World was of a par 
with her lack of understanding of structural racism in the American republic and ideological 
racism in the transatlantic slave trade, which she had already failed to adequately address in both 
Origins and On Revolution. To support her distinction between race thinking and racism as an 
ideology Arendt had downplayed the ideological racism of slavery, which in the American 
context was present much earlier than the nineteenth-century, as well as the racial dimensions of 
earlier settler colonialisms.102 Arendt was clear that slavery was the ‘primordial crime upon which 
the fabric of American society rested’.103 She acknowledged that ‘the extermination of native 
peoples went hand in hand with the colonization of the Americas, Australia and Africa’.104 But 
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she also claimed that North America and Canada were ‘almost empty and had no serious 
population problem’. Echoing the Africa of Origins, these were places ‘without a culture and a 
history of their own’.105 Perhaps this is why she never condemned settler colonialism with the 
same vehemence with which she rebuked ‘unlimited’ imperial expansion. In Arendt’s eyes, 
neither the annihilation of Native Americans nor the institution of chattel slavery was enough to 
discredit her fabled version of the American Revolution.106 She claimed that in the eighteenth-
century American slaveholders viewed slavery as only a temporary institution and that the 
Founders knew that slavery and ‘the foundation of freedom’ were incompatible.107 But she did 
not analyse the contradiction in any depth, nor did she extend her condemnation of European 
imperialists to the American founders. Instead, she suggested that slavery was not as bad as 
statelessness, for at least slave labour ‘was needed, used, and exploited, and this kept them within 
the pale of humanity. To be a slave was after all to have a distinctive character, a place in society  
- more than the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human’.108 Yet slaves were 
not conceived as ‘fully human’; they were property. Arendt did not accuse the American 
revolutionaries of the same hypocrisy as the interwar statesmen and humanitarians who insisted 
that the millions of stateless really were in possession of ‘in-born’ and ‘inalienable’ rights.109 
Instead, she praised the Founders for not falling under the sway of the Social Question - poverty 
and the ‘degrading misery… of slavery and Negro labor’110 - to focus on founding institutions for 
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political freedom. Slavery was a price worth paying to found an enduring republican government 
for some: the American slaveholders. 
Arendt wrote brilliantly about the deprivations of statelessness and the political problems 
of minorities in interwar Europe. But she was unable to extend her analysis to those who 
experienced themselves as stateless and rightless within an imperial nation-state purportedly 
founded on rights but built on setter colonialism and slave labour.111 Indeed, while Arendt 
marginalised the constitutive role of slavery and praised the American Revolution she did not 
mention its role in the revolution in France and completely ignored the one prominent revolution 
that was led by slaves, in Haiti.112 Slave revolts, slave revolutions, did not fit into Arendt’s model 
of revolutionary founding. As Sibylle Fischer has put it, ‘Slaves vanish… in the abyss between 
the social and the political. Revolutionary antislavery is a contradiction in terms. Haiti becomes 
unthinkable’.113 It is also unthinkable because Arendt needed to deny the boomerang effect from 
operating in the New World.114 The problem is not fully captured in Dana Villa’s description of 
Arendt’s postcolonial critics, that she simply ‘didn’t go far enough and she wasn’t inclusive 
enough in her indictment of European modernity’.115 It is that even when applied to the political 
context in which it was written, Arendt’s political theory does not offer the theoretical resources 
to analyse racial violence and resistance to racial oppression. She celebrated violent and 
nonviolent resistance. Yet she did not consider violence by black activists in the United States as 
a form of legitimate self-defence and hence could not theorise such struggles within a colonial 
and imperial nation-state, again despite her analysis of these state forms in Origins. This is why 
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Arendt insisted that the ‘Negro question’ could only be ‘addressed within the political and 
historical framework’ of the republic. But the claim rested on a distorted historical and political 
analysis of race and violence in America, an effective disavowal of deep transnational structures 
of white supremacy that must be addressed within a political and historical framework beyond her 
beloved American republic.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has shown that Hannah Arendt’s political analysis of race in America foundered, in 
no small measure, on her effort to deny its irreducibly colonial and imperial context. Arendt was 
unable to assimilate the violent imperial origins of racial hierarchies into her idealisation of the 
American republic. The ‘Negro question’ had to be contained inside US domestic politics, 
severed from it colonial and imperial origins, to avoid an open race war and to validate her faith 
in America’s republican institutions. The consequences have been a deep chasm between her still 
prescient insights on the conditions of statelessness and the extremely limited resources in her 
political theory for analysing and resisting white supremacy. It is no surprise then that the racism 
in Arendt’s thought has been all but ignored in the generally laudatory readings of her work 
within IR, including by the present author.116 Hence, the critique of Arendt offered in this article 
is also a self-critique. In previous work, I largely bracketed what I knew to be Arendt’s racist 
assertions about Africans in Origins and African-Americans in ‘On Violence’ and proceeded to 
draw on her work to analyse what I believed to be different, unrelated phenomena. I now see that 
Arendt’s Euro-centrism was not just analytical but also celebratory, and that this has seeped into 
my own work.117 For example, I paid insufficient attention to the antiprimitivist underpinnings of 
Arendt’s distinction between life and world when discussing contemporary refugees and human 
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security.118 The problem with such a distinction may go beyond Arendt’s denigration of those she 
deemed unworldly; it might be racist and colonial to the core.119 In writing on Anglo-American 
counterinsurgency, I emphasised European imperialism to the neglect of settler colonialism and 
its racisms, which is far more significant for understanding the relationship between war-making 
and state-making in the United States.120  
Hannah Arendt, like many in IR, was unable to fully escape the discourse of European 
superiority in which she was trained and acculturated. Hence we should be wary of condemning 
the woman herself. There is no ‘interpretative “high road”’ from which to read Arendt.121 But her 
thought, and our own, must also be held to account in the effort to decolonise the theory canon for 
IR. It would be easy to write her work off, for much of what she wrote was unclear, contradictory, 
and even worse, it was misogynistic, racist, Orientalist, elitist, and unnecessarily antagonistic 
toward Marx. But there are no un-problematic thinkers. Franz Fanon held deeply sexist and 
homophobic views, yet he remains indispensible to critical studies of race and hence non-racist 
international theory.122 Arendt held deeply problematic views about people of African descent 
that go to the core of, and even call into question, much that has been valued and celebrated in her 
work. The question is how many of her signature contributions to political thought rest on racist 
and ethnocentric premises, and whether anything is left of the work if these premises can be 
severed and fully reworked.123 There is no easy way to find out except through such a reworking 
and there is no one-size-fits-all checklist that can be applied across canonical thinkers. But to 
refuse the work may be to miss what Arendt got right, to miss certain things that nobody else but 
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she had fathomed. It would also forego certain insights that Arendt too was unable to imagine, but 
nonetheless might inspire in others. 
 
 
